Abstract
ALBERT SHALOM PROPOSES that a framework for understanding mind and personal identity more adequate than either idealistic or traditional materialistic frameworks can be found in a quasi-materialist theory. In The Body/mind Conceptual Framework and the Problem of Personal Identity he criticizes most formulations of the materialist thesis, yet maintains that the physical has in a sense to be taken as ontologically primary. His is a dialectical concept of matter: a concept related to two types of time, linear and what he calls "quasi-nonlinear time." The formulations of the notions of time and of the physical develop through his criticisms and what he calls "the elaboration of those basic conditions without which it would be impossible, in my view, to even conceive of an ultimately convincing theory of what we call 'the person'." The elaboration turns out to imply physicalism, but an ontologically opaque physicalism. This opacity is based on an analysis of physical existence per se as incomprehensible.