Can you think my 'I'-thoughts?

Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):68-85 (2009)
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Abstract

If tokens of 'I' have a sense as well as a reference the question immediately arises of what account to give of their sense. One influential kind of account, of which Gareth Evans provides the best developed instance, attempts to elucidate the sense of 'I' partly in terms of the distinctive functional role possessed by thoughts containing this sense ('I'-thoughts). Accounts of this kind seem to entail that my 'I'-thoughts cannot be entertained by anyone other than me, a consequence generally thought unacceptable. I defend it. I also justify a functional role account of the sense of 'I'. The result should be to make plausible an account of the sense of 'I' in terms of the functional role of 'I'-thoughts.

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Daniel Morgan
University of York

Citations of this work

Self-made People.David Mark Kovacs - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1071-1099.
Explaining Public Action.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):475-485.
Can Fregeans Have 'I'-Thoughts?Alexandre Billon & Marie Guillot - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica (136):97-105.

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References found in this work

Frege on demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
Do demonstratives have senses?Richard Heck - 2002 - Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-33.

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