Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts

Abstract
_ Source: _Page Count 25 This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition and proposes an explanation of why we have a faulty intuition. The second response, which we favor, accommodates all three intuitions; it reconciles the first and the third intuition by the dual component model of justification, and defends the second intuition by distinguishing two principles of epistemic closure.
Keywords skepticism   Bayesianism   epistemic closure   Linda case   epistemic justification
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DOI 10.1163/22105700-006011213
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References found in this work BETA
Transmission of Justification and Warrant.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2013 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Citations of this work BETA
Externalism, Skepticism and Epistemic Luck.Zivan Lazovic - 2011 - Filozofija I Društvo 22 (1):89-102.

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