Explanatory priority and the counterfactuals of freedom

Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):21-35 (2001)
On a Molinist account of creation and providence, not only is there is a complete set of truths about what every possible person would freely do in any possible set of circumstances, but these conditional truths are part of the very explanation of our existence. Robert Adams has recently argued that the explanatory priority of these conditionals undermines libertarian freedom. In the present essay, I take at close look at Adams’ argument and at the Molinist response of Thomas Flint. After showing that Flint’s response is inadequate, I develop what I believe to be a more successful Molinist response to Adams’ argument. Along the way, I seek to provide some insight into the nature of libertarian freedom and the proper interpretation of the much discussed “principle of alternate possibilities.”
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 0739-7046
DOI 10.5840/faithphil200118110
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Ken Perszyk (2013). Recent Work on Molinism. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):755-770.
Heimir Geirsson & Michael Losonsky (2005). What God Could Have Made. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):355-376.

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