El reino de los derechos y la objetividad de la moral

Análisis Filosófico 23 (2):117-150 (2003)

Jose Juan Moreso
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
This paper intends to show that it is possible to take convincingly into account the platitudes which underlie our moral practice. It deals with the articulation of an indirect strategy to answer the arguments of moral scepticism: if we can generate a conceptual space that takes such platitudes into account, perhaps we could ignore the sceptic doubts.Several metaethical conceptions can ecumenically carry out this task. Particularly, even if moral realism implies cognitivism and objectivism, moral objectivism –the plausibility of rational agreement in morals- does presuppose necessarily neither realism nor cognitivism.An argument against moral relativism is also presented. It is argued that there are several ways of pluralism compatible with the very field of moral objectivity.The conclusion maintains that only an objectivist account of our moral practice is apt to make sense of our institutional designs that acknowledge universal human rights
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