Heidegger's critique of Husserl's and Brentano's accounts of intentionality

Abstract
Inspired by Aristotle, Franz Brentano revived the concept of intentionality to characterize the domain of mental phenomena studied by descriptive psychology. Edmund Husserl, while discarding much of Brentano?s conceptual framework and presuppositions, located intentionality at the core of his science of pure consciousness (phenomenology). Martin Heidegger, Husserl?s assistant from 1919 to 1923, dropped all reference to intentionality and consciousness in Being and Time (1927), and so appeared to break sharply with his avowed mentors, Brentano and Husserl. Some recent commentators have sided with Heidegger and have endorsed his critique of Husserl and Brentano as still caught up in epistemological, representationalist approaches to intentionality. I argue that Heidegger is developing Husserl, focusing in particular on the ontological dimension of intentionality, not reversing or abandoning his account. Heidegger?s criticisms of representationalism merely repeat Husserl?s. Furthermore, I argue that Husserl?s account of cognitive intentionality, which recognizes the importance of the disinterested theoretical attitude for scientific knowledge, has been underestimated and misunderstood by Heidegger, who treats scientific cognition as a deficient form of practice. In short, Heidegger is more dependent on Husserl than he ever publicly acknowledged.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/002017400321361
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,827
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Intentionality: Some Lessons From the History of the Problem From Brentano to the Present.Dermot Moran - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.
Heidegger's Metaphysics of Material Beings.Kris McDaniel - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):332-357.
Perception and Action: On the Praxial Structure of Intentional Consciousness.Panos Theodorou - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):303-320.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality.George Bealer - 1996 - In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
Classical Intentionality.Uwe Meixner - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (1):25-45.
Intensionality and Intentionality.Stephen F. Barker - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
Heidegger's Early Critique of Husserl.Søren Overgaard - 2003 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (2):157 – 175.
The Philosophy of Brentano.Linda L. McAlister (ed.) - 1976 - Humanities Press.
Brentano's Influence on Husserl's Early Notion of Intentionality.Peter Andras Varga - 2008 - Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai - Philosophia (1-2):29-48.
The Concept of Intentionality.Herman Philipse - 1986 - Philosophy Research Archives 12:293-328.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
146 ( #35,419 of 2,210,107 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #125,746 of 2,210,107 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature