In defence of state‐based reasons to intend

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228 (2010)
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Abstract

A state‐based reason for one to intend to perform an action F is a reason for one to intend to F which is not a reason for one to F. Are there any state‐based reasons to intend? According to the Explanatory Argument, the answer is no, because state‐based reasons do not satisfy a certain explanatory constraint. I argue that whether or not the constraint is correct, the Explanatory Argument is unsound, because state‐based reasons do satisfy the constraint. The considerations that undermine the Explanatory Argument also generate a strong, positive case for the existence of state‐based reasons to intend.

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James Morauta
University College, Oxford

Citations of this work

Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality?Andrew Reisner - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):436-462.
Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.
So why can’t you intend to drink the toxin?Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):294-311.

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References found in this work

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.

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