Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228 (2010)
A state-based reason for one to intend to perform an action F is a reason for one to intend to F which is not a reason for one to F. Are there any state-based reasons to intend? According to the Explanatory Argument, the answer is no, because state-based reasons do not satisfy a certain explanatory constraint. I argue that whether or not the constraint is correct, the Explanatory Argument is unsound, because state-based reasons do satisfy the constraint. The considerations that undermine the Explanatory Argument also generate a strong, positive case for the existence of state-based reasons to intend.
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References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior.R. Mele Alfred - 1992 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.
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