In defence of dogmatism

Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282 (2015)
Authors
Luca Moretti
University of Aberdeen
Abstract
According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, you often have prima facie justification for believing p that doesn’t rest on your independent justification for believing any proposition. Although dogmatism has an intuitive appeal and seems to have an antisceptical bite, it has been targeted by various objections. This paper principally aims to answer the objections by Roger White according to which dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian account of how evidence affects our rational credences. If this were true, the rational acceptability of dogmatism would be seriously questionable. I respond that these objections don’t get off the ground because they assume that our experiences and our introspective beliefs that we have experiences have the same evidential force, whereas the dogmatist is uncommitted to this assumption. I also consider the question whether dogmatism has an antisceptical bite. I suggest that the answer turns on whether or not the Bayesian can determine the priors of hypotheses and conjectures on the grounds of their extra-empirical virtues. If the Bayesian can do so, the thesis that dogmatism has an antisceptical bite is probably false.
Keywords Dogmatism  Bayesianism  Perceptual scepticism  Perceptual justification  Immediate justification  Explanationism  Jim Pryor  Roger White  Nico Silins
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Reprint years 2015, 2016
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-014-0293-0
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References found in this work BETA

Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

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Citations of this work BETA

Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.
How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist.Brian T. Miller - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):766-780.
Internalism Without Luminosity.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):252-272.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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