Ratio Juris 22 (1):62-73 (2009)

Authors
Jose Juan Moreso
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Abstract
This paper deals with the possibility of faultless disagreement in law. It does this by looking to other spheres in which faultless disagreement appears to be possible, mainly in matters of taste and ethics. Three possible accounts are explored: the realist account, the relativist account, and the expressivist account. The paper tries to show that in the case of legal disagreements, there is a place for an approach that can take into account our intuitions in the sense that legal disagreements are genuine and at times faultless.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2008.00412.x
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Hybrid Dispositionalism and the Law.Teresa Marques - 2019 - In Kevin Toh, David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press.
Beyond Consensus: Law, Disagreement and Democracy. [REVIEW]Valerio Nitrato Izzo - 2012 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 25 (4):563-575.
The Untouchables of Law.J. J. Moreso - 2016 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 19 (4):496-503.

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