Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21 (forthcoming)
AbstractRelationalists about episodic memory must endorse a disjunctivist theory of memory-experience according to which cases of genuine memory and cases of total confabulation involve distinct kinds of mental event with different natures. This paper is concerned with a pair of arguments against this view, which are analogues of the ‘causal argument’ and the ‘screening off argument’ that have been pressed in recent literature against relationalist theories of perception. The central claim to be advanced is that to deal with these two arguments, memory disjunctivists both can and should draw on resources that are standardly appealed to by rival common factor theories of episodic memory, and, in particular, to the idea that genuine memories and merely apparent ones are to be distinguished, at least in part, in terms of the distinctive ways in which they are caused. On the proposed view, there are substantive causal constraints associated both with cases of genuine memory and with cases of mere confabulation. The resulting theory thus tells us something important about the nature both of genuine memories and of mere confabulations, namely, that such experiences must be caused in certain distinctive ways and cannot occur except as the result of a distinctive sort of causal process. In addition, the theory enables the disjunctivist to offer a unified response to an important pair of arguments against her view.
Similar books and articles
Two Forms of Memory Knowledge and Epistemological Disjunctivism.Joe Milburn & Andrew Moon - 2019 - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.
Two Informational Theories of Memory: A Case From Memory-Conjunction Errors.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2020 - Disputatio 12 (59):395-431.
Entries on 'Memory and Knowledge' and on 'Causal Theories of Memory'.Christoph Hoerl - 2013 - In Harold Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. SAGE Publications.
The Philosophy of Memory Today and Tomorrow: Editors' Introduction.Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. pp. 1-9.
Mod en teori om kausale hukommelsesprocesser: præliminære bemærkninger.Mathias Christensen - 2018 - Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi 6 (2):73-94.
Erros de Memória e Erros de (Teorias da) Memória [Errors of Memory and Errors of (Theory of) Memory].Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2019 - Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia 10 (3):108.
Beyond the Causal Theory? Fifty Years After Martin and Deutscher.Kourken Michaelian & Sarah Robins - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. pp. 13-32.
Mental Time Travel and Disjunctivism.István Aranyosi - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):367-384.
Opening the Doors of Memory: Is Declarative Memory a Natural Kind?Kourken Michaelian - 2015 - Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 6 (6):475-482.
Is Mental Time Travel Real Time Travel?Michael Barkasi & Melanie G. Rosen - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-27.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Radicalizing Simulationism: Remembering as Imagining the (Nonpersonal) Past.Kourken Michaelian - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-27.
References found in this work
The Causal Theory of Perception.H. P. Grice & Alan R. White - 1961 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35 (1):121-168.
On Being Alienated.Michael G. F. Martin - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.