Psychology for cooperators

In Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge University Press. pp. 153 (2001)

Authors
Adam Morton
University of British Columbia
Abstract
I discuss what learned and innate routines of self and other attribution agents need to possess if they are to enter into cooperative arrangements as described game theoretically. I conclude that these are not so different from belief desire psychology as described by philosophers of mind.
Keywords cooperation  Belief-desire psychology  Attribution of psychological states
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Social Functions of Knowledge Attributions.James R. Beebe - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 220--242.
Bargaining and Agreement in Gauthier's Moral Contractarianism.Edwin Etieyibo - 2013 - South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):221-233.

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