In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
I am concerned with Crispin Wright (2004, 2008, 2012 and 2014)’s entitlement theory, according to which (1) we have non-evidential justification for accepting propositions of a general type, which Wright calls cornerstones, and (2) this non-evidential justification for cornerstones can secure evidential justification for believing many other propositions––those we take to be true on the grounds of ordinary evidence. I initially focus on Wright’s strategic entitlement, which is one of the types of entitlement that Wright has described in more detail. Wright (2014) argues that strategic entitlement is a form of epistemic justification rather than pragmatic, as some critics have contended. I respond that whether or not strategic entitlement is epistemic, it is very dubious that there are cornerstones we are strategically entitled to accept. Thus, it is very implausible that that (1) could be defended by appealing to strategic entitlement. After this, I argue that even if (1) were true, (2) would be false because non-evidential justification for accepting cornerstones cannot secure evidential justification for believing ordinary propositions. This criticism is more ambitious than the previous one because it aims to strike all forms of epistemic entitlement introduced by Wright at once. My argument relies on elementary probabilistic regimentations of the so-called leaching problem.
|Keywords||epistemic entitlement Crispin Wright non-evidential justification scepticism|
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References found in this work BETA
Wright, Okasha and Chandler on Transmission Failure.Luca Moretti - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):217-234.
Transmission of Justification and Warrant.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2013 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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