Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier

New York: Cambridge University Press (2001)
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Abstract

What are preferences and are they reasons for action? Is it rational to cooperate with others even if that entails acting against one's preferences? The dominant position in philosophy on the topic of practical rationality is that one acts so as to maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences. This view is most closely associated with the work of David Gauthier, and in this collection of essays some of the most innovative philosophers working in this field explore the controversies surrounding Gauthier's position. Several essays argue against influential conceptions of preference, while others suggest that received conceptions of rational action misidentify the normative significance of rules and practices. This collection will be of particular interest to philosophers of social theory and to reflective social scientists in such fields as economics, political science and psychology.

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Arthur Ripstein
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

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Hobbesianische Theorien des Sozialvertrags.Vuko Andrić - 2019 - Aufklärung Und Kritik 69 (3):93-104.

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