Physicalism, Truthmaking, and Levels of Reality: Prospects and Problems

Topoi 37 (3):473-482 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper considers the extent to which the notion of truthmaking can play a substantive role in defining physicalism. While a truthmaking-based approach to physicalism is prima facie attractive, there is some reason to doubt that truthmaking can do much work when it comes to understanding physicalism, and perhaps austere metaphysical frameworks in general. First, despite promising to dispense with higher-level properties and states, truthmaking appears to make little progress on issues concerning higher-level items and how they are related to how things are physically. Second, it seems that truthmaking-based approaches to physicalism will have a difficult time addressing the status of truthmaking itself without, in effect, appealing to the resources of alternative ways of conceptualizing physicalism.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,323

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Non-reductive physicalism?A. D. Smith - 1993 - In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Causal Closure, Causal Exclusion, and Supervenience Physicalism.Kevin Morris - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):72-86.
Physicalism, supervenience and the fundamental level.Robin Brown & James Ladyman - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):20-38.
Can physicalism be non-reductive?Andrew Melnyk - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296.
Physicalism and Classical Theism.Peter Forrest - 1996 - Faith and Philosophy 13 (2):179-200.
Type Physicalism and Causal Exclusion.Joseph A. Baltimore - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:405-418.


Added to PP

139 (#134,444)

6 months
22 (#124,517)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kevin Morris
Tulane University