"The Bayesian Objection" - Ch 4 of Seemings and Justification (Forthcoming)


Authors
Luca Moretti
University of Aberdeen
Abstract
In this chapter I analyse an objection to phenomenal conservatism to the effect that phenomenal conservatism is unacceptable because it is incompatible with Bayesianism. I consider a few responses to it and dismiss them as misled or problematic. Then, I argue that this objection doesn’t go through because it rests on an implausible formalization of the notion of seeming-based justification. In the final part of the chapter, I investigate how seeming-based justification and justification based on one’s reflective belief that one has a seeming interact with one another.
Keywords Phenomenal conservatism  dogmatism  Bayesianism  Roger White  perceptual justification  seemings
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Phenomenal Conservatism and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):267-280.
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