In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer (2020)

Luca Moretti
University of Aberdeen
In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesn’t yield lethal or substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism.
Keywords cognitive penetrability  cognitive penetration  seemings  phenomenal conservatism  the rationality of perception  Susanna Siegel  Michael Huemer  perceptual justification
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