Cognitive Penetrability

In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer (2020)
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Abstract

In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesn’t yield lethal or substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism.

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Luca Moretti
University of Eastern Piedmont

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References found in this work

Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.

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