"Cognitive Penetrability" - Ch 3 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification

In Seemings and Epistemic Justification. Springer (2020)
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Abstract

In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesn’t yield lethal or substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism.

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Luca Moretti
University of Aberdeen

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