"Concluding Remarks" - Ch 6 of Seemings and Justification (Forthcoming)


Authors
Luca Moretti
University of Aberdeen
Abstract
In this chapter I draw the conclusions of my investigation into phenomenal conservatism. I argue that phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually plagued by serious problems attributed to it by its opponents, but that it neither possesses all the epistemic merits that its advocates think it has. I suggest that phenomenal conservatism could provide a more satisfactory account of everyday epistemic practices and a more robust response to the sceptic if it were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. I also identify questions and issues relevant to the assessment of phenomenal conservatism to be investigated in further research.
Keywords phenomenal conservatism  foundationalism  scepticism  non-inferential justification  immediate justification  reflective awareness
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