Concluding Remarks

In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer (2020)
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Abstract

In this chapter I draw the conclusions of my investigation into phenomenal conservatism. I argue that phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually plagued by serious problems attributed to it by its opponents, but that it neither possesses all the epistemic merits that its advocates think it has. I suggest that phenomenal conservatism could provide a more satisfactory account of everyday epistemic practices and a more robust response to the sceptic if it were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. I also identify questions and issues relevant to the assessment of phenomenal conservatism to be investigated in further research.

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Author's Profile

Luca Moretti
University of Eastern Piedmont

References found in this work

Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer (ed.) - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):234-237.
How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist.Brian T. Miller - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):766-780.
The problem of memory knowledge.Michael Huemer - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):346–357.
The Problem of Memory Knowledge.Michael Huemer - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):346-357.

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