RE: From prefix to paradigm

World Futures 61 (4):254 – 267 (2005)

Abstract
This article is a translated chapter from a large study of the philosophy of ecology and biology. It looks at the vast array of reiterative processes in nature and culture and argues that continuous recursion is the core activity that sustains living processes at all levels. Therefore, the prefix "re," which is central to the concepts of repetition, renewal, reinforcement, regeneration, reorganization, recursion, and religion, is a radical concept that should be considered at the paradigmatic level. The author shows that by working "revolutions into its revolutions" the process of RE complexly unifies and intermixes the past and future in order to generate the creative pulse of evolution.
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DOI 10.1080/02604020590952583
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