Ratnākaraśānti’s Theory of Cognition with False Mental Images and the Neither-One-Nor-Many Argument

Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (2-3):339-351 (2014)

Abstract
The paper aims to clarify Ratnākaraśānti?s epistemological theory that mental images in a cognition are false (*alīkākāravāda) in comparison with Śāntarakṣita?s criticism of the Yogācāra position. Although Ratnākaraśānti frequently uses the neither-one-nor-many argument for explaining his Yogācāra position, the argument, unlike Śāntarakṣita?s original one, does not function for refuting the existence of awareness itself as the basis of mental images. This point is examined in the first two sections of this paper by analyzing Ratnākaraśānti?s proof of the selflessness of entities (dharmanairātmya) and his application of the neither-one-nor-many argument for demonstrating the falsehood of mental images. On the other hand, the last section investigates into his defense of the alīkākāravāda against Śāntarakṣita?s severe criticism of it. Here, too, we can find his tactical usage of the neither-one-nor-many argument, or more precisely, one of its variants: the neither-identical-nor-different argument. Through the above procedure, we can see how Yogācāra philosophy survived in the late period of Indian Buddhism by blending the Madhyamaka opponent?s argument with its own thought
Keywords Ratnākaraśānti  Śāntarakṣita  Alīkākāravāda  Neither-one-nor-many argument
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DOI 10.1007/s10781-013-9200-9
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Remarks on the Origin of All-Inclusive Pervasion.Kiyokuni Shiga - 2011 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4-5):521-534.

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Is Ratnākaraśānti a gZhan Stong Pa?Hong Luo - 2018 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 46 (3):577-619.

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