Supervenience and computational explanation in vision theory

Philosophy of Science 60 (1):86-99 (1993)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to Marr's theory of vision, computational processes of early vision rely for their success on certain "natural constraints" in the physical environment. I examine the implications of this feature of Marr's theory for the question whether psychological states supervene on neural states. It is reasonable to hold that Marr's theory is nonindividualistic in that, given the role of natural constraints, distinct computational theories of the same neural processes may be justified in different environments. But to avoid trivializing computational explanations, theories must respect methodological solipsism in the sense that within a theory there cannot be differences in content without a corresponding difference in neural states

Similar books and articles

The Role of Natural Constraints in Computational Theories of Vision.Peter Alan Morton - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
Marr’s Theory of Vision and the Argument From Success.Peter A. Morton - 1988 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988 (1):154-161.
Marr's Theory of Vision and the Argument from Success.Peter A. Morton - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:154 - 161.
Content individuation in Marr's theory of vision.Basileios Kroustallis - 2006 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (1):57-71.
Marr’s Computational Theory of Vision.Patricia Kitcher - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (March):1-24.
A clearer vision.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-53.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
430 (#48,347)

6 months
89 (#58,785)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?