Shared Knowledge from Individual Vice: the role of unworthy epistemic emotions

Abstract

This paper begins with a discussion the role of less-than-admirable epistemic emotions in our respectable, indeed admirable inquiries: nosiness, obsessiveness, wishful thinking, denial, partisanship. The explanation for their desirable effect is Mandevillian: because of the division of epistemic labour individual epistemic vices can lead to shared knowledge. In fact it is sometimes essential to it.

Download options

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-13

Downloads
334 (#32,391)

6 months
17 (#49,635)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Adam Morton
PhD: Princeton University; Last affiliation: University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science.Uwe Peters - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):1061-1081.
Can Closed-Mindedness Be an Intellectual Virtue?Heather Battaly - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:23-45.
Vices of the Mind: A Reply to ALFANO, PLAKIAS, TANESINI, and VIGANI.Quassim Cassam - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):881-888.
Emotion.Charlie Kurth - 2022 - Routledge.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A New Role for Emotions in Epistemology.Georg Brun & Dominique Kuenzle - 2008 - In Georg Brun, Ulvi Dogluoglu & Dominique Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions. Ashgate Publishing Company. pp. 1--31.
Epistemic Badness.Anthony T. Flood - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Research 33:253-262.
Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 225.
Epistemic Responsibility.J. Angelo Corlett - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):179 – 200.
The Division of Epistemic Labor.Sandy Goldberg - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):112-125.
Regulating Inquiry.Christopher Hookway - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:149-157.
Epistemic Self-Indulgence.Heather Battaly - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):214-234.
The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models.Sven Diekmann & Martin Peterson - 2013 - Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (1):207-218.
Do We See with Microscopes?Elisabeth Pacherie - 1995 - The Monist 78 (2):171-188.
Epistemic malevolence.Jason Baehr - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):189-213.