Structuralist reduction concepts as structure-preserving maps

Synthese 77 (2):215 - 250 (1988)
Thomas Mormann
University of the Basque Country
The aim of this paper is to characterize the various structuralist reduction concepts as structure-preserving maps in a succinct and unifying way. To begin with, some important intuitive adequacy conditions are discussed that a good (structuralist) reduction concept should satisfy. Having reconstructed these intuitive conditions in the structuralist framework, it turns out that they divide into two mutually incompatible sets of requirements. Accordingly there exist (at least) two essentially different types of structuralist reduction concepts: the first type stresses the existence of a deductive or inferential link between the reducing and the reduced theory; the second type emphasizes the greater explanatory power the reducing theory should have in comparison with the reduced theory. The problem of the incompatibility of equally plausible reduction concepts is treated in the last section and a proposal is made for its solution consisting in the definition of a multiple synthetizing reduction relation.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00869435
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,086
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Logic of Explanation.Carl G. Hempel & Paul Oppenheim - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.
The logical structure of mathematical physics.J. D. Sneed - 1975 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (1):151-152.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Bibliography of Structuralism.W. Diederich, A. Ibarra & T. Mormann - 1989 - Erkenntnis 30 (3):387-407.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
55 ( #124,315 of 2,313,330 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #353,451 of 2,313,330 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature