Axiomathes 20 (2-3):229 - 253 (2010)

Thomas Mormann
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München (PhD)
David Lewis famously argued against structural universals since they allegedly required what he called a composition “sui generis” that differed from standard mereological com¬position. In this paper it is shown that, although traditional Boolean mereology does not describe parthood and composition in its full generality, a better and more comprehensive theory is provided by the foundational theory of categories. In this category-theoretical framework a theory of structural universals can be formulated that overcomes the conceptual difficulties that Lewis and his followers regarded as unsurmountable. As a concrete example of structural universals groups are considered in some detail.
Keywords Structural Mereology  Structural Universals  Categories
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DOI 10.1007/s10516-010-9105-0
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References found in this work BETA

A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
In Defence of Structural Universals.D. M. Armstrong - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):85 – 88.

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Mereology.Achille C. Varzi - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Properties.Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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