Tal and Comesaña on evidence of evidence

The Reasoner 10 (5):38-39 (2016)
Abstract
R. Feldman defends a general principle about evidence the slogan form of which says that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. B. Fitelson considers three renditions of this principle and contends they are all falsified by counterexamples. Against both Feldman and Fitelson, J. Comesaña and E. Tal show that the third rendition––the one actually endorsed by Feldman––isn’t affected by Fitelson’s counterexamples, but only because it is trivially true and thus uninteresting. Tal and Comesaña defend a fourth version of Feldman’s principle, which––they claim––has not yet been shown false. Against Tal and Comesaña I show that this new version of Feldman’s principle is false.
Keywords Evidence of evidence is evidence  Feldman  Fitelson  Comesaña  Tal
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Evidence of Evidence is Evidence.Juan Comesaña & Eyal Tal - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):557-559.

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