The Converse Consequence Condition and Hempelian Qualitative Confirmation

Philosophy of Science 66 (3):448- (1999)
Abstract
In this paper, I offer a proof that a disastrous conclusion (namely, that any observation report confirms any hypothesis) may be derived directly from two principles of qualitative confirmation which Carl Hempel called the "Converse Consequence Condition" and the "Entailment Condition." I then discuss three strategies which a defender of the Converse Consequence Condition may deploy to save this principle
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DOI 10.1086/392697
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