Utilitas 17 (2):205-221 (2005)
Most contemporary political philosophers deny that justice requires giving people what they deserve. According to a familiar anti-desert argument, the influence of genes and environment on people's actions and traits undermines all desert-claims. According to a less familiar – but more plausible – argument, the influence of genes and environment on people's actions and traits undermines some desert-claims (or all desert-claims to an extent). But, it says, we do not know which ones (or to what extent). This article examines this ‘epistemological’ argument against desert. It gives reason to believe that it fails, emphasizing the importance of justice relative to efficiency and attempting to construct a practical way of measuring desert.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Desert in Liberal Justice: Beyond Institutional Guarantees.J. P. Messina - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):248-267.
Desert and the Control Asymmetry.David Alm - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):361 - 375.
Similar books and articles
A Solution to the Problem of Indeterminate Desert.Bradford Skow - 2012 - Mind 121 (481):37-65.
Smilansky, Arneson, and the Asymmetry of Desert.Jeffrey Moriarty - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):537-545.
Desert Tracks Character Alone.Stephen Kershnar - 2008 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):71-88.
Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511.
Desert and Distributive Justice in a Theory of Justice.Jeffrey Moriarty - 2002 - Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (1):131–143.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads83 ( #62,526 of 2,164,828 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #128,940 of 2,164,828 )
How can I increase my downloads?