Erkenntnis 64 (1):115-138 (2005)
Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and I argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes (1998) and Kuipers (2000) are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue that the same strategy is unavailable to the hypothetico-deductivist.
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References found in this work BETA
Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - MIT Press.
A New Theory of Content II: Model Theory and Some Alternatives. [REVIEW]Ken Gemes - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):449-476.
Hypothetico-Deductivism: The Current State of Play; The Criterion of Empirical Significance: Endgame.Ken Gemes - 1998 - Erkenntnis 49 (1):1 - 20.
Citations of this work BETA
Aboutness and Negative Truths: A Modest Strategy for Truthmaker Theorists.Arthur Schipper - forthcoming - Synthese:1-38.
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