The tacking by disjunction paradox: Bayesianism versus hypothetico-deductivism

Erkenntnis 64 (1):115-138 (2006)
Abstract
Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and I argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes (1998) and Kuipers (2000) are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue that the same strategy is unavailable to the hypothetico-deductivist.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1007/s10670-005-5059-9
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References found in this work BETA
Philosophy of Natural Science.Carl G. Hempel - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
Relevant Deduction.Gerhard Schurz - 1991 - Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):391 - 437.
A New Theory of Content II: Model Theory and Some Alternatives. [REVIEW]Ken Gemes - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):449-476.

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Citations of this work BETA
Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Princeton University Press.
Hypothetico-Deductive Confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.

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