The Uncertain Relation Between Coherence and Renown: Ronald Dworkin Reconsidered


Authors
Andrew Morrison
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
The article presents a critical reassessment of the legal philosophical writings of Ronald Dworkin. Relying in part upon the author’s previous argument that law is – contra the recent near-consensus – best understood as “the command of the sovereign, backed by force,” the author identifies fundamental difficulties, and ultimately incoherency, in Dworkin’s work.
Keywords Ronald Dworkin  H.L.A. Hart  John Austin  Jeremy Bentham  positivism  interpretivism  natural law  game theory  convention  command model
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