Dialectica 33 (3‐4):201-216 (1979)
AbstractSummaryIt is shown that the concept of understanding cannot be reduced to a combination of knowing that, knowing how, and knowledge by acquaintence. First, it is shown that understanding and knowledge have different objects. Then “understanding what” is analyzed along Aristotelian lines. In the central part of the paper it is shown that understanding objects defined by constitutive rules involves a non‐propositional component. This notion of “understanding” is shown to cut across the humanist‐scientist dichotomy
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