Whether a Creature is More Perfect in Itself or in God's Knowledge According to Saint Thomas Aquinas

Dissertation, Marquette University (1997)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his Summa Theologiae, Saint Thomas Aquinas states that an effect is found more perfectly in its cause than in itself. When analyzed in terms of the relationship between God and creation, it seems that a creature should be more perfect in God than as actually existing. This last statement seems problematic if, as many scalars have claimed, Saint Thomas' philosophical position maintains that actual existence lies at the heart of the reality of any effect. ;Why problematic? Because if actual existence makes something be real --since it is the "actuality of all actuations and the perfection of all perfections" --then it seems at the very least, paradoxical, that even though what intrinsically and as a component perfects an effect is existence, the effect is more perfect in its cause than it is in itself. ;Now, an authentic existentialism maintains that an effect is real or perfect when it actually exists and not as it is found in its cause . However, an essentialism maintains the converse. ;In Saint Thomas one finds an abundance of texts which give support to an existentialist interpretation of his metaphysical position. However, there are four texts--In I Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2; De Veritate, q. 4, a, 6 sol.; Summa Theologiae, I, 18, 4 ad 3; De Substantiis Separatis, c. 14, lines 57-86--which seem to argue that a creature is more perfect as it is in God than as it is in itself. These texts would support an essentialist interpretation of his position. ;Thus, through a careful examination of these four texts, this dissertation answers the general question of whether Saint Thomas Aquinas is an essentialist or existentialist by examining his answer to the more specific question of whether a creature is more perfect in itself or in God's knowledge

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 97,042

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-07

Downloads
6 (#1,644,048)

6 months
5 (#1,300,540)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joseph Mordente
Marquette University (PhD)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references