When Do Replies to the Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism Beg the Question?

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Justin Morton
University of California, Davis
Abstract
Some proponents of the evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism believe that replies that assume substantive moral claims beg the question. In this paper, I give a new account of what’s wrong with such replies. On this account, many realists beg the question when they rely on substantive moral claims in their replies to the argument, but naturalists do not. While this account generalizes to some other domains, it allows perceptual and inductive realism to go un-debunked.
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2018.1455718
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A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.

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