Authors
Luca Moretti
University of Aberdeen
Abstract
In this paper, I show that Lewis' definition of coherence and Fitelson's and Shogenji's measures of coherence are unacceptable because they entail the absurdity that any set of beliefs in general is coherent and not coherent at the same time. This devastating result is obtained if a simple and plausible principle of stability for coherence is accepted.
Keywords coherence  coherence measures  Bayesian coherence measures
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