Analysis 63 (4):297–300 (2003)
Three confirmation principles discussed by Hempel are the Converse Consequence Condition, the Special Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition. Le Morvan (1999) has argued that, when the choice among confirmation principles is just about them, it is the Converse Consequence Condition that must be rejected. In this paper, I make this argument definitive. In doing that, I will provide an indisputable proof that the simple conjunction of the Converse Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition yields a disastrous consequence.
|Keywords||formal epistemology confirmation theory|
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References found in this work BETA
Aspects of Scientific Explanation.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1965 - In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Free Press. pp. 504.
Citations of this work BETA
Confirmation.Alan Hájek & James M. Joyce - 2008 - In S. Psillos & M. Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Routledge.
Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Science.Stathis Psillos & Martin Curd (eds.) - 2008 - Routledge.
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