Philosophical Studies 124 (2):129-180 (2005)
AbstractSensations of acting and control have been neglected in theory of action. I argue that they form the core of action and are integral and indispensible parts of our actions, participating as they do in feedback loops consisting of our intentions in acting, the bodily movements required for acting and the sensations of acting. These feedback loops underlie all activities in which we engage when we act and generate our control over our movements.The events required for action according to the causal theory, or Searle
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Citations of this work
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References found in this work
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1986 - MIT Press.