Epistemology Formalized

Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43 (2013)
Abstract
This paper argues that just as full beliefs can constitute knowledge, so can properties of your credence distribution. The resulting notion of probabilistic knowledge helps us give a natural account of knowledge ascriptions embedding language of subjective uncertainty, and a simple diagnosis of probabilistic analogs of Gettier cases. Just like propositional knowledge, probabilistic knowledge is factive, safe, and sensitive. And it helps us build knowledge-based norms of action without accepting implausible semantic assumptions or endorsing the claim that knowledge is interest-relative.
Keywords probabilistic knowledge  epistemic modals  factivity  interest relativity
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1215/00318108-1728705
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,169
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Belief, Credence, and Norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Skill in Epistemology II: Skill and Know How.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):650-660.
A Counterexample to Modus Tollens.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):1001-1024.
Information as a Probabilistic Difference Maker.Andrea Scarantino - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):419-443.
How to Be an Ethical Expressivist.Alex Silk - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):47-81.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology.Peter Baumann - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):523-551.
A Probabilistic Theory of Knowledge.Igal Kvart - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1):1–43.
Why Epistemology Cannot Be Operationalized.Timothy Williamson - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
Fallibilism and the Flexibility of Epistemic Modals.Charity Anderson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):597-606.
Epistemology Today: A Perspective in Retrospect. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (3):309 - 332.
'Knows' Entails Truth.Michael Hannon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:349-366.
Dretske on Knowledge and Content.Olav Gjelsvik - 1991 - Synthese 86 (March):425-41.
Knowledge, Experiments, and Practical Interests.Ángel Pinillos - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 192.
Interest-Relative Invariantism. [REVIEW]Stephen Schiffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188 - 195.
Added to PP index
2011-10-14

Total downloads
210 ( #19,645 of 2,191,918 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #12,048 of 2,191,918 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature