Kant and Wittgenstein: Common sense, therapy, and the critical philosophy

Philosophia 37 (1):1-20 (2009)
Abstract
Kant’s reputation for making absolutist claims about universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience are put here in the broader context of his goals for the Critical philosophy. It is shown that within that context, Kant’s claims can be seen as considerably more innocuous than they are traditionally regarded, underscoring his deep respect for “common sense” and sharing surprisingly similar goals with Wittgenstein in terms of what philosophy can, and at least as importantly cannot, provide.
Keywords Kant  Common sense  Metaphysical modesty  Wittgenstein
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-008-9140-x
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