Philosophy of Science 73 (5):930-946 (2006)

Lenny Moss
University of Exeter
Radically new or unexpected findings in a science demand an openness to new concepts and styles of explanation. The time is more than ripe for asking ourselves what we have learned from the research program of comparative genomics. Where not long ago the human genome was expected to reveal a close association of complexity with the quantitative expansion of the roster of unique genes, more recent findings, especially in relation to comparisons between human and chimp, have raised the bracing possibility that when it comes to complexity, it may be that `less is more'. But `less is more' is not the only observation or inference that follows from the data. The idea of `progressive detachment' will be introduced and set forth as the most perspicuous conceptual resource for unifying and interpreting the overall findings from comparative genomics to date.
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DOI 10.1086/518778
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References found in this work BETA

What Genes Can't Do.Lenny Moss - 2002 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Sequence Matters: Genomic Research and the Gene Concept.Laura Perini - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):752-762.
Animality, Sociality, and Historicity in Helmuth Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology.Phillip Honenberger - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):707-729.
Normativity, system-integration, natural detachment and the hybrid hominin.Lenny Moss - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):21-37.

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