Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: On the Meaning of Logos

Phronesis 59 (3):181-230 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Something Aristotle calls ‘right logos’ plays a crucial role in his theory of virtue. But the meaning of ‘logos’ in this context is notoriously contested. I argue against the standard translation ‘reason’, and—drawing on parallels with Plato’s work, especially the Laws—in favor of its being used to denote what transforms an inferior epistemic state into a superior one: an explanatory account. Thus Aristotelian phronēsis, like his and Plato’s technē and epistēmē, is a matter of grasping explanatory accounts: in this case, accounts that identify the right action and say why it is right. Arguably, Aristotelian rationality is a matter of being able to grasp accounts in general

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,369

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-07

Downloads
271 (#75,971)

6 months
22 (#125,216)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jessica Moss
New York University

References found in this work

Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Aristotle's first principles.Terence Irwin - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Practical intelligence and the virtues.Daniel C. Russell - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Reason and human good in Aristotle.John Madison Cooper - 1975 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Early Greek philosophy.John Burnet - 1908 - New York,: Meridian Books.

View all 58 references / Add more references