Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions


Authors
Paul K. Moser
Loyola University, Chicago
Abstract
This paper outIines an account of rational action. It distinguishes three species of reasons: motivating reasons, evidential reasons, and normative reasons. It also contends that there is a univocal notion of reason common to the notions of motivating reasons, evidential reasons, and normative reasons. Given this thesis, the paper explains how we can have a unified theory of reasons for action. It also explains the role of values in rational action. It sketches an affective approach to value that contrasts with prominent desire-satisfaction approaches
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 1053-8364
DOI 10.5840/jpr_1990_13
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The Epistemology of Testimonal Trust.Jesper Kallestrup - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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