Two paradoxes of rational acceptance

&
Erkenntnis 23 (2):127 - 141 (1985)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article provides a straightforward diagnosis and resolution of the lottery paradox and the epistemic version of the paradox of the preface. In doing so, The article takes some steps in relating the notion of probability to the notion of epistemic justification.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1007/bf00169962

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,423

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Acceptance without Belief.Patrick Maher - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:381-392.
Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief.Richard Jeffrey - 1970 - In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, acceptance, and rational belief. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 157-185.
Solving the paradoxes, escaping revenge.Hartry Field - 2007 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Paradoxes of intensionality.Dustin Tucker & Richmond H. Thomason - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411.
Competing for Acceptance Lehrer's Rule and the Paradoxes of Justification.Erik J. Olsson - 1998 - Theoria 64 (1):34-54.
Reeling and a-reasoning: Surprise examinations and newcomb's tale.Peter Cave - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (4):609-616.
What the liar taught Achilles.Gary Mar & Paul St Denis - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):29-46.
Capacity updating rules and rational belief change.Matthew J. Ryan - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (1):73-87.
A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
36 (#434,037)

6 months
2 (#1,240,909)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jeffrey Tlumak
Vanderbilt University

Citations of this work

A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.
From probabilities to categorical beliefs: Going beyond toy models.Igor Douven & Hans Rott - 2018 - Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (6):1099-1124.
The preface paradox revisited.Igor Douven - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420.
Logic of the preface paradox.Dale Jacquette - 2008 - Principia 12 (2):203-216.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references