Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):45-65 (2009)

This paper is intended to defend the Principle of Alternative Possibilities against two recent putative counterexamples to it, inspired by the one that HarryFrankfurt designed forty years ago. The first three sections provide a summary of the state of the art. In the remaining sections, the counterexamples to pap o Widerker’s and Pereboom’s are successively presented and discussed. We hold that both examples breach at least one otwo conditions that are required in order to refute pap, namely, that the agent is morally responsible for his/her decision and that s/he lacks any morally significant alternatives to it. Regarding, the examples face several problems concerning the “reasons-responsiveness” of the agent’s mechanism of deliberation and decision making, which throws doubts upon his/her moral responsibility. Regarding, we try to show that the respective agents have robust alternatives within their reach. We conclude, then, that pap is not refuted by these examples.
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References found in this work BETA

Freedom to Act.Donald Davidson - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Routledge.
Frankfurt on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.Margery Bedford Naylor - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (September):249-58.
Further Thoughts About a Frankfurt-Style Argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.

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