Minds and Machines 30 (1):1-21 (2020)

Authors
Tomer Fekete
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Shimon Edelman
Cornell University
Abstract
Scientific theories of consciousness identify its contents with the spatiotemporal structure of neural population activity. We follow up on this approach by stating and motivating Dynamical Emergence Theory, which defines the amount and structure of experience in terms of the intrinsic topology and geometry of a physical system’s collective dynamics. Specifically, we posit that distinct perceptual states correspond to coarse-grained macrostates reflecting an optimal partitioning of the system’s state space—a notion that aligns with several ideas and results from computational neuroscience and cognitive psychology. We relate DET to existing work, offer predictions for empirical studies, and outline future research directions.
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-020-09516-9
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References found in this work BETA

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Mental Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Toward a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 1990 - Seminars in the Neurosciences 2:263-275.

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The Disunity of Consciousness.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):378-95.

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