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Abstract
In this paper, we distinguish two ways in which someone can be said to believe a proposition. In the light of this distinction, we question the widely held equivalence between considering a proposition true and believing that proposition. In some cases, someone can consider a proposition true and not properly believe it. This leads to a distinction between the conventional meaning of the sentence by which a subject expresses a belief and the content of this belief. We also question some principles of belief ascription, suggest a solution to a famous puzzle about belief and defend the unity of the semantic and causalaspects of beliefs.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
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ISBN(s) 1811-833X
DOI 10.5840/eps20133842
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