The best possible child

Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (5):279-283 (2007)

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Abstract
Julian Savulescu argues for two principles of reproductive ethics: reproductive autonomy and procreative beneficence, where the principle of procreative beneficence is conceptualised in terms of a duty to have the child, of the possible children that could be had, who will have the best opportunity of the best life. Were it to be accepted, this principle would have significant implications for the ethics of reproductive choice and, in particular, for the use of prenatal testing and other reproductive technologies for the avoidance of disability, and for enhancement. In this paper, it is argued that this principle should be rejected, and it is concluded that while potential parents do have important obligations in relation to the foreseeable lives of their future children, these obligations are not best captured in terms of a duty to have the child with the best opportunity of the best life
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DOI 10.1136/jme.2006.018176
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Reasons and Persons.B. C. Postow - 1988 - International Studies in Philosophy 20 (3):136-137.
Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach.J. Thompson - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):111 – 113.
Duties and Virtues.Onora O'Neill - 1993 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 35:107-120.

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Reproductive Choice, Enhancement, and the Moral Continuum Argument.E. Malmqvist - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (1):41-54.

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