Wiley (1993)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
This book attempts to place a realist view of ethics within a broader context. It starts with a discussion of why we should mind about the difference between right and wrong, asks what account we should give of our ability to learn from our moral experience, and looks in some detail at the different sorts of ways in which moral reasons can combine to show us what we should do in the circumstances. The second half of the book uses these results to mount an attack on consequentialism in ethics, arguing that there are more sorts of reasons around than consequentialists can even dream of.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories |
No categories specified (categorize this paper) |
Buy this book | Amazon page |
ISBN(s) | 9780631187929 0631187928 9780631187929 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason.Ruth Chang - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.
Moral Particularism.Jonathan Dancy - 2009 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University.
View all 105 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
The Weight of Moral Reasons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (Ed. Mark Timmons) 3:35-58.
Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism.Andrew Reisner & Joseph Van Weelden - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):429-448.
Direct Moral Grounding and the Legal Model of Moral Normativity.Benjamin Sachs - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):703-716.
Practical Reasons and Moral 'Ought'.Patricia Greenspan - 2007 - In Russell Schafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. II. Clarendon Press. pp. 172-194.
Reasons and Moral Principles.Pekka Väyrynen - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. pp. 839-61.
Obligating Reasons, Moral Laws, and Moral Dispositions.Luke Robinson - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):1-34.
Reasons, Inescapability and Persuasion.Neil Sinclair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2823-2844.
Reasons, Rational Requirements, and the Putative Pseudo-Question “Why Be Moral?”.John J. Tilley - 2008 - Synthese 161 (2):309 - 323.
Empathy, Shared Intentionality, and Motivation by Moral Reasons.Marion Hourdequin - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):403 - 419.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2017-02-16
Total views
1 ( #1,546,110 of 2,507,392 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,983 of 2,507,392 )
2017-02-16
Total views
1 ( #1,546,110 of 2,507,392 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,983 of 2,507,392 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.