Topoi 39 (5):1073-1088 (2018)

Authors
Hedda Hassel Mørch
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences
Abstract
According to recent arguments for panpsychism, all physical properties are dispositional, dispositions require categorical grounds, and the only categorical properties we know are phenomenal properties. Therefore, phenomenal properties can be posited as the categorical grounds of all physical properties—in order to solve the mind–body problem and/or in order avoid noumenalism about the grounds of the physical world. One challenge to this case comes from dispositionalism, which agrees that all physical properties are dispositional, but denies that dispositions require categorical grounds. In this paper, I propose that this challenge can be met by the claim that the only dispositional properties we know are phenomenal properties, in particular, phenomenal properties associated with agency, intention and/or motivation. Versions of this claim have been common in the history of philosophy, and have also been supported by a number of contemporary dispositionalists. I will defend a new and updated version of it. Combined with other premises from the original case for panpsychism—which are not affected by the challenge from dispositionalism—it forms an argument that dispositionalism entails panpsychism.
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-018-9604-y
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References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

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The Ineffability of Induction.David Builes - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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