Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?

Erkenntnis 84 (5):1065-1085 (2018)

Authors
Hedda Hassel Mørch
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences
Abstract
The Integrated Information Theory is a leading scientific theory of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper, I consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of panpsychism, known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid the main problems of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show that if IIT were compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that the view does not avoid the main problems of physicalism and dualism after all. I then show that the theories are not compatible as they currently stand, in view of what I call the coarse-graining problem. After I explain the coarse-graining problem, I will offer two possible solutions, each involving a small modification of IIT. Given either of these modifications, IIT and Russellian panpsychism may be fully compatible after all, and jointly enable significant progress on the mind–body problem.
Keywords Integrated Information Theory  Panpsychism  Russellian monism
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Reprint years 2019
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-018-9995-6
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