The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):131-142 (2020)
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Abstract

The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. In this response, I will briefly outline the phenomenal powers view and my main arguments for it and—drawing in part on a similar view developed by Harold Langsam—discuss how more precisely its answer to the challenge would go.

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Hedda Hassel Mørch
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences

Citations of this work

Psychophysical Harmony: A New Argument for Theism.Brian Cutter & Dustin Crummett - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
Panpsychism.William E. Seager, Philip Goff & Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Debunking Arguments for Illusionism About Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):258-281.
How You Know You’re Conscious: Illusionism and Knowledge of Things.Matt Duncan - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.

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