In Piotr Stalmaszcyzk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos Verlag. pp. 385 (2012)

Andrei Mărăşoiu
University of Bucharest
This paper explores whether Jeffrey King's theory of propositions is committed to an obscure metaphysics which identifies propositions with certain kinds of facts. §1 presents the problem to which King tries to provide a solution, the problem of the unity of the proposition. §2 presents King's doubtful identification of propositions with certain existentially generalized facts over languages, words, speakers, contexts, times and places. §3 sketches a host of objections to the identification made in §2, provided King’s identification is taken to be a substantive metaphysical claim. Given the failure of such a metaphysical reading, §4 argues in favor of a deflationist approach according to which we can better understand propositions by attempting to ramsify them – to provide substitutes that do all the explanatory work propositions do but are not metaphysically dubious. I argue King's claim to identify propositions with facts is better interpreted as an example of such a ramsification project, and not in a metaphysically substantive way.
Keywords propositions
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